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1.1. The Present Predicament 
While economic theory has been enormously influential since the eighteenth century, 
the level of dominance of culture, politics and ethics gained by it in the last few 
decades is unprecedented. Not only has economic theory taken the place of political 
philosophy and ethical discourse and imposed its own concepts and image of society 
on other social sciences, it has redefined the natural sciences through its own 
categories as nothing but instruments of production, investment in which is to be 
judged in terms of its profitability. No longer does economics justify its claim to be a 
science on its supposed success at modeling itself on physics; it stands in judgement of 
physics and demands of physicists that they justify themselves in economic terms. 
Literature and the arts have also been redefined, as part of the entertainment industry, 
also to be judged in terms of profitability and contribution to GNP. Rationality itself 
has been redefined by rational choice theorists to accord with the economists’ model of 
economic choice within the market. There is no common good, participation in the 
pursuit of which could give meaning to people’s lives; according to rational choice 
theorists there is only the satisfaction of diverse individual subjective preferences 
(Amadae, 2003, p.111ff.). Governments almost everywhere (apart from New Zealand 
and some countries in South American where such policies have now lost all 
credibility) are redefining their relationship to their citizens through the categories of 
economics (Osborne & Gaebler, 1993) and under the influence of economists (and the 
pressure of transnational corporations, the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO) are 
imposing market relations on virtually every facet of social, political and cultural life. 
This involves deregulating markets, freeing trade, removing impediments to capital 
mobility, privatizing public assets, applying the “user pays” principle to allocate 
resources, applying economic principles to government and measuring success in 
purely “economic” terms. Even after whole countries have been thrown into economic 
chaos, as vast numbers of people are losing their livelihoods, welfare institutions are 
being dismantled, democracy is being undermined and, most ominously, the global 
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eco-system is being degraded, there has been only weak resistance to these 
developments, apparently because the majority of humankind, or at least most of those 
with any power, have come to see themselves and their everyday relationships, both to 
other people and to nature, through the categories of economics. Politicians in 
particular, appear oblivious to any other way of conceiving the world. 
These might appear to be extreme claims; but this is because economics has been 
so successful in colonizing the way people think in their everyday lives that it is difficult 
to appreciate the uniqueness of present culture. One way to highlight this uniqueness 
is to consider one country, Britain, a century ago (that is, when Alfred North 
Whitehead was involved in politics). It is generally assumed that Britain at that time 
was dominated by much the same thinking that dominates the present. Not so. The 
most powerful political and cultural force at the time was social liberalism (or New 
Liberalism), a movement largely inspired by the Idealist philosopher T.H. Green 
(1836-1882) (Boucher, 1997, p.viiiff.). Green had attacked the notion that freedom is 
gained through freely entered contracts and that the State’s primary role is to protect 
property and enforce contracts, arguing that contracts made between people with 
unequal power, as between employees and employers, could not be called free (Green, 
1986, 194ff.) Inspired by Kant, Fichte and Hegel, Green argued instead that freedom is 
gained by participating in democratic communities united in the quest for a common 
good; most importantly, the quest to develop people’s potential to participate in 
community life. “When we speak of freedom” he wrote, “we mean a positive power or 
capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, 
something that we do or enjoy in common with others.” Green continued: “When we 
measure the progress of a society by its growth in freedom, we measure it by the 
increasing development and exercise on the whole of those powers of contributing to 
social good with which we believe the members of the society to be endowed; in short, 
by the greater power on the part of the citizens as a body to make the most and best of 
themselves” (Green, 1986, p.199). The highest good, never fully realized, is not 
increase in GNP but human perfection pursued through institutions. As Green put it, 
“There are arts and institutions and rules of life, in which the human spirit has so far 
incompletely realized its idea of a possible Best; and the individual in whom the idea is 
at work will derive from it a general injunction to further these arts, to maintain and, 
so far as he can, improve these institutions” (Green, 2003, p.431). The State’s mission is 
to nurture the potential of its citizens to live the best possible life by enabling them to 
participate in these projects.  
From the 1880s onwards social liberals, inspired directly or indirectly by Green’s 
philosophy, undertook a crusade against poverty and ignorance as barriers to freedom 
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and democracy, argued for the rights of women to be educated and to vote, defended 
the role of the State to control the economy, and opposed imperialism. “The State 
arises” David Ritchie wrote, “to ensure that the individual shall be fully realized, 
chiefly through his own conscious action. The State guarantees him his individuality, 
which Society with its self-seeking struggle of competitors tends to efface” (Ritchie, 
1902, p.155). Social liberals demonstrated empirically that poverty was socially 
produced and systemic in nature, not the fault of individuals. L.T. Hobhouse and J.A. 
Hobson argued that wealth was created by society rather than individuals, and that 
the State owed its citizens the means of maintaining a civilized life, a debt, Hobhouse 
argued, “not adequately discharged by leaving him to secure such wages as he can in 
the haggling of the market” (Hobhouse, 1911, p.164). Hobhouse also called for wealth 
taxes to “quench the antisocial ardour for unmeasured wealth, for social power and 
the vanity of display” (p.201). The older laissez-faire liberalism was deemed to be 
theoretically and practically obsolete. The inequality and poverty engendered by 
laissez-faire economics were seen to be bad not simply on utilitarian grounds, but 
because it made it impossible for people to develop their potential and function 
effectively as citizens of a democracy. Apart from calling for intervention in the 
economy to eliminate poverty, social liberals campaigned for free public education, set 
up the Workers’ Educational Association to educate the working class and called for 
free public libraries and galleries. Reading books and contemplating works of art were 
not seen as mere entertainment but as part of self-education and the development of 
oneself as a person, the supreme duty of people as citizens of a democracy (Murdoch, 
1903, p.236f.).  
While social liberalism was inspired by philosophers, it was also developed by 
political theorists and economists. While John Hobson was the major economist in this 
tradition in the first decades of the twentieth century, John Maynard Keynes to some 
extent continued the tradition of social liberalism. Apart from his economic theories 
concerned to show how depressions can be avoided through State involvement in the 
economy, Keynes, through his involvement in negotiating the Bretton Woods 
Agreement, strove to create a world order in which democratic States could control 
their own markets and their own destinies and cultivate higher ends than avarice.  
The triumph of economics to its present despotic position was not the triumph of 
economic science as such, but the triumph of neo-classical economics – and the revival 
of Social Darwinism. Neo-classical economics is based on the analysis of market 
behaviour, assuming isolated, utility maximizing economic agents with diminishing 
marginal utilities for each commodity. Prices are supposedly determined by supply and 
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demand schedules the shape of which is determined by diminishing marginal utility, 
with prices supposedly determined by the intersection of these schedules, indicating 
that it is at this price with these quantities that demand and supply will be equal. At 
this equilibrium point the value of the marginal item will be exchanged for its value 
equivalent, with all other items of this kind exchanged in the market resulting in a 
value gain for those involved in the exchange. Value is treated as not something 
objective but as something subjective, revealed by what people are willing to pay. The 
economy is then represented as a circular flow of money between business enterprises 
and households (or the public) with business paying for land, labour and money (as 
rent, wages and salaries, and interest respectively) and gaining profits through its 
entrepreneurial efforts, while the households pay for goods and services. Neo-classical 
economics has its roots in the work of Jevons (in England), Menger (in Austria) and 
Walras (in Switzerland and France), each developing their ideas in the 1870s (at about 
the same time that Green was elaborating his ideas) (Pibram, p.277ff.). Jevons set out to 
rebuild economics as “the mechanics of utility and self interest” (Jevons, 1924, p.21). While 
this idea has been influential, it was the mathematically oriented Walrasian school with 
its model of general equilibrium which eventually prevailed. The conclusions drawn 
from the work of this school, that it is through the free operation of the market that 
scarce resources will be most efficiently distributed between unlimited wants, has been 
supported also by the less mathematically oriented and more evolutionary Austrian 
school deriving from Menger, promoted most vigorously by Friedrich von Hayek.  
How did this tradition triumph? Keynesian economics, advancing the insights of 
Hobson and challenging the cozy conclusions of neo-classical economics that free 
markets will tend to an equilibrium in which there will be full employment of labour 
(unemployment on this model being explained by the unwillingness of labour to accept 
lower wages), had been vindicated by the Great Depression and the success of 
solutions he provided for it. But while Keynesian economics was widely embraced, 
social liberalism was in decay. In USA Keynes’ ideas were reinterpreted through neo-
classical marginalist theory, and this paved the way for the revival of neoclassical 
economics and the almost complete eclipse of Keynesian thought (Harcourt, 1982, 
p.355ff.). This occurred in the 1970s, and neo-classical economics has dominated ever 
since. This ascendancy has been associated with the privileging of abstract 
mathematical models of the market which has had the effect of excluding the general 
population from participation in economic debates. Neo-classical economics, 
elaborated into the ideology of neo-liberalism (or more accurately, managerialist 
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market fundamentalism) has come to almost completely dominate public policy 
formation. This is the basis of our present predicament. 
1.2. The Challenge of Ecological Economics to Neo-Classical Economics 
Neo-classical economics has not gone unchallenged. In fact there has been a 
bewildering array of challenges to it, with both alignments and conflicts between the 
challengers. Basic assumptions have been questioned even within neo-classical 
economics. Criticisms have ranged from pointing out that even in terms of their own 
assumptions, neoclassical economists have not been able to show that there is any 
reason for markets to move to an optimal equilibrium, to questioning the central 
assumptions about markets, human nature and society together with assumptions 
about the nature of science and scientific explanation on which neo-classical 
economics is based (Gowdy and Erikson, 2005, p.208). Criticisms have been leveled at 
the characterization of economic actors as egoistic utility maximizers and objections 
have been made to analyses of factor markets on the assumption that these are 
essentially the same as markets for goods and services. In relation to the labour market, 
Green’s point, that employers and employees have unequal power in the marketplace, 
has been reiterated (Nell, 1980, p.23f.). The assumption of diminishing marginal 
productivity of capital, required to show that there is an equilibrium point in capital 
markets, has been shown to be highly problematic. Developments within 
mathematical economics associated with complexity theory have revolutionary 
implications. Brian Arthur focused on “increasing returns”, that is, markets where 
success feeds on itself to generate more success (Arthur, 1994). In such circumstances, 
which are normal rather than exceptional, there is no tendency towards equilibrium, 
and it is necessary to treat the economy as much more dynamic, creative and 
destructive, than neo-classical economists have been prepared to acknowledge. 
Complexity theory also gives a place to emergence, implying limits to the reductionism 
assumed by neo-classical economics. By showing that present conditions are 
dependent upon the paths which have generated them, such work requires economists 
to acknowledge the importance of history (Ormerod, 1994). Arthur’s work has 
effectively vindicated the historical, institutionalist, evolutionary economics that neo-
classical economics first displaced and then almost obliterated (Hodgson, 2001). It has 
also been pointed out that despite the acknowledgement of land as a factor of 
production and Jevons’ appreciation of the limits to energy resources, the concepts of 
neo-classical economics virtually excluded nature from consideration (Groh and 
Sieferle, 1980). The neo-classical model of economic growth is inconsistent with the 
second law of thermodynamics and oblivious to the dynamics of eco-systems, including 
the global eco-system. The rapid destruction of resources and eco-systems for short 
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term profit increases can be shown to be entirely rational on neo-classical assumptions, 
suggesting something irrational in neo-classical characterizations of rationality. It has 
also provided further reasons for investigating the relationship between the dynamics 
of economies, other social formations, and the rest of nature. Most importantly, this 
justifies a greater concern with the relationship between the dynamics of economies 
and the dynamics of eco-systems, particularly the dynamics of the global economy and 
local ecosystems (Bunker, 1985). In doing so, these critiques of mainstream economics 
provide overwhelming reasons for reviving fundamental questions about the nature of 
the knowledge and what it is to be a science.  
It is here that major problems arise, however. What I have presented is a very 
schematic account of arguments against neo-classical economic theory. As noted, there 
is no consensus among the opponents of neo-classical economics. The political 
economy movement led by Joan Robinson attempted to revive a left Keynesianism, 
and failed (Kregel, 1975; Nell, 1980). Marxist critics divided on the most basic issues of 
what Marxism stands for (Roosevelt, 1975). Students in France have sparked a global 
movement for post-autistic economics, but they are clearer on what they oppose than 
what they stand for. Institutionalists attempted to chart an alternative path to 
mainstream and Marxist economics (Mirowski, 1986). This movement had some 
success, but those involved in this revival are finding that they have to retrace the 
history of historical and institutional economics and confront the problems within it 
which led to its eclipse by neo-classical economics. It is necessary to meet again 
Menger’s challenge to historical economics and the limits of Thorstein Veblen’s efforts 
to develop institutionalist economics (Hodgson, 2001, p.75ff., p.150f.). Attempts to 
make economics into an evolutionary science have forced institutional economists to 
confront disputes within evolutionary science (Mirowski, 1994; Hodgson, 1999). Such 
developments align institutionalist economists with some of the economists grappling 
with environmental problems (Söderbaum, 2000, p.21ff.). Not that there is any 
consensus here. There is a division between the environmentalist economists who have 
attempted to extend neo-classical economics to deal with environmental problems, 
attempting to incorporate “externalities” into the market, and ecological economists 
who have attempted to characterize economics as part of the broader science of 
ecology (Spash, 1999). This has presented another problem, since ecology is by no 
means a unified discipline. As in economics, divisions among ecologists extend to 
conflicts about what is knowledge and what is science (Levins and Lewontin, 1985). It 
might seem that complexity theory provides the necessary bridge between mainstream 
economics, institutional economics, ecological economics, ecology and evolutionary 
theory on which a new synthesis might be built; but “complexity” defines a problem 
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rather than the solution, and there is a range of rival research programs addressing this 
problem (Gare, 2000a). Mirowski, a proponent of institutionalist economics, has 
severely criticized complexity theory as a new phase in mechanistic thought (Mirowski, 
2002).  
Despite problems within it, it is ecological economics which is now emerging as the 
most potent opposition to neo-classical economics. It is ecological economics which 
addresses the most profound failure of neo-classical economics, the failure to deal 
adequately with resource depletion and environmental destruction locally, and more 
importantly, globally (Constanza, 1991, Söderbaum, 2000). In doing so, it has drawn 
on the whole range of arguments against mainstream economics, including the 
relationship between economics and other sciences (Røpke, 2004, 2005). All problems 
and debates within and over economics have thereby been brought into focus. As two 
proponents of ecological economics proclaimed, human ecology is “the only heterodox 
school of economics focusing on both the human economy as a social system, and as a 
system embodied in the biophysical universe, and thus both holistic and scientifically 
based,” going on to claim that “ecological economics is poised to play a leading role in 
recasting the scope and method of economic science” (Gowdy and Erickson, 2005, 
p.207). In doing so, ecological economics simultaneously raises all the most basic 
questions about what is knowledge, what is science, what is the nature of physical 
existence, of life, of humanity, of society and of the individual. While this has 
generated a range of debates, ecological economics suffers from a weak identity 
(Røpke, 2005, p.286). The challenge it faces is to hold together as a radical challenge to 
mainstream economics in virtually every respect.  
1.3. Economics and Philosophy 
Given the chaotic state of debates in economics and the challenges confronting 
ecological economics, we need to examine the history of both economics and 
philosophy to bring into the open unexamined philosophical assumptions befuddling 
these debates. It is also necessary to see what happened to social liberalism and why it 
lost its impetus. To begin with, it is necessary to look at epistemology, most 
importantly, the development of logical positivism and the influence of its vision of 
science. But it is also necessary to look behind this to the rivalry between broader 
traditions of thought about humanity, society and politics and how this has been 
affected by logical positivism.  
Logical positivism emerged as part of the new tradition of analytic philosophy 
which developed in opposition to the Idealism inspired by Green. Logical positivists 
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were concerned to invalidate not only the claims but the whole project of metaphysics, 
and the metaphysics its proponents usually had in mind were the metaphysics of 
Idealism. So, whether intentionally or not, logical positivism was centrally involved in 
undermining the ideals about life and society and how society should be organized 
proposed by Green and the social liberals he inspired. However, this was not simply a 
matter of undermining Green’s philosophy and influence - an influence associated not 
only with social liberalism but the rise of the welfare state and social democracy. It was 
also a matter of facilitating a revival of the ideas that Green and the British Idealists 
had been concerned to overcome. To begin with, it is clear that the triumph and 
influence of logical positivism greatly helped the advance of neo-classical economics. 
While von Hayek was not a logical empiricist, the influence of logical positivism is 
clearly evident in the characterization of economics as a science by the major 
proponent of neo-classical economics and neo-liberalism in USA, Milton Friedman 
(Friedman, 1953, Part I; Hollis and Nell, 1979). Such logical positivism was later 
assumed unconsciously by economists who attempted to develop computer models of 
the economy. What mattered was constructing mathematical models from which 
predictions could be made and tested, even if the predictions were all wrong; all other 
forms of intellectual inquiry were held to be “unscientific” and not worthy of being 
taken seriously. This means that ideas deriving from social liberalism could easily be 
dismissed.  
Logical positivism also facilitated the revival of a broader tradition of thought that 
the social liberals had opposed: social Darwinism. If there was one philosopher the 
British Idealists were opposed to it was Herbert Spencer. Spencer had coined the 
phrase “survival of the fittest” which had been embraced by Darwin. Spencer used this 
idea to present a vision of evolutionary progress driven by the struggle for survival in 
which the fitter defeat and dominate the weaker. Spencer, who was also editor of The 
Economist, argued that the free market economy in which individuals struggle against 
each other to satisfy their insatiable appetites is the basis for continued evolutionary 
progress (Spencer, 1969, p.141ff.; Spencer, 1973, p.73). For this to work, the State 
should withdraw support from the losers in this struggle within the market, since this 
will interfere with the mechanism driving evolutionary progress. Competition between 
countries should also become economic competition. The role of the State in society is 
merely to keep in place the rules of the market, most importantly, protecting property. 
This political philosophy was presented as part of the scientific vision of the world, or, 
in the language of Spencer’s friend, John Tyndall (and fellow member of the “X Club” 
which was attempting promote science as the core of education and of culture) as part 
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of “scientific materialism”, a term Tyndall coined in 1868 (Barton, 1987; Harman, 
2001, p.199). While this vision of the world is not explicitly invoked by neo-liberals, it is 
presupposed by them and neo-liberalism gained immense impetus through the revival 
of social Darwinism (Lewontin et.al, 1984), largely made possible through the defence 
by logical empiricists of reductionist forms of explanation. The revival of social 
Darwinism reached its highest point with the development of socio-biology in the 
1970s where social behaviour was explained as nothing but the effect of the struggle for 
survival by selfish genes. Explicitly aligning himself with Spencer, the foremost socio-
biologist, Edward O. Wilson, argued that “the individual organism is only their 
vehicle, part of an elaborate device to preserve and spread them with the least possible 
biochemical perturbation (Wilson, 1975, p.3). To some extent the triumph of neo-
classical economics is merely a manifestation of the revival of Spencer’s social 
Darwinism.  
Logical positivism had its greatest impact by undermining the philosophical 
movements which challenged the assumptions of social Darwinism. What were these 
movements? There was more to Anglophone philosophy in the late nineteenth century 
and early twentieth century than the opposition between social Darwinism and 
Idealism. “Scientific materialism” had already met with opposition within physics from 
Clerk Maxwell and his colleagues (Harman, 2001, p.199ff.). Maxwell’s work, 
developing field theory in physics, was one of the high points in the tradition, 
ultimately inspired by Leibniz and Boscovich, concerned to overcome the mechanistic 
cosmology of the Newtonians. Maxwell was Einstein’s hero, and the theories of 
relativity continued this tradition of thought. While Darwinian evolutionary theory 
was taken as vindicating scientific materialism, evolutional theory had originally been 
revived by opponents of Newtonian thought who had wanted to exalt humanity as the 
product of a creative nature (Richards, 2003, p.298ff.). There were tensions in both 
Spencer’s and Darwin’s theories, and good reason to draw different political 
conclusions than those drawn by Spencer from the theory. Darwin himself eventually 
drew different conclusions (Richards, 2003, p.547ff.). While disputes in these areas 
were underway, logic was being revolutionized by the importation into it of the 
algebraic techniques developed within mathematics. While logical positivism had 
drawn heavily on this new logic, particularly as it had been developed by Frege, in 
USA Charles Sanders Peirce advanced and utilized symbolic logic to different ends – 
to justify speculative thought (as abduction) and to develop a revised form of Objective 
Idealism incorporating a radicalized form of evolutionary theory (Peirce, 1955, p.322). 
In Britain, some of Green’s followers, most notably Ritchie, were attempting to 
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advance Idealism by synthesizing it with Darwinian evolutionary theory (Ritchie, 1893, 
pp.38-76). While this synthesis provided some support to the social liberals, in general, 
evolutionary theory was held to be incompatible with Idealism and political theorists 
such as Hobhouse (who had been influenced by Green) and the economist Hobson felt 
that nature was inadequately appreciated in Idealism. During the First World War 
they came to believe the Hegelian idea of the State was responsible for German 
militarism (Clarke, 1978, p.193) and, distancing themselves from Idealism, moved 
towards a new form of non-reductionist naturalism giving a place to emergence. This 
was being supplied by Samuel Alexander who had attended Balliol College when 
Green was in residence, and who early in his career had attempted to reformulate 
Green’s ethical philosophy to reconcile it with Darwin’s evolutionary theory. 
Alexander embraced both the theories of relativity and Lloyd Morgan’s notion of 
emergence and attempted to reformulate them into a new, evolutionary cosmology 
construing nature as essentially creative. Even more significant than its opposition to 
Idealism, logical positivism was important for having subverted this effort to develop a 
new, post-mechanist naturalism. 
2. THE IMPORTANCE OF WHITEHEAD 
It is against this background that we need to understand the significance of Whitehead. 
Whitehead was actively involved in politics. He was aligned with the social liberals of 
the Liberal Party although he also had some sympathy for the emerging Labour Party 
of which he later became a supporter (ESP 19f.; Lowe, 1985, p.313f.). He had been 
taught “that beauty, moral and aesthetic, is the aim of existence; and that kindness, 
and love, and artistic satisfaction are among its modes of attainment” (ESP 15) and he 
was concerned to uphold what he had been taught. He anticipated a future democracy 
in which “every man and every woman will be trained for a free intellectual life” (ESP 
180). But at the same time he was a mathematician, a mathematical physicist, a 
logician and philosopher of mathematics and science, and a metaphysician. 
Whitehead was strongly influenced by Maxwell and concerned to interpret and 
advance his new physics. He was also a central figure in the development of the new 
symbolic logic, advancing Peirce’s rather than Frege’s conception of logic. He had 
been strongly influenced by Idealist philosophy, but believed it was necessary to go 
beyond their work, utilizing advances in the sciences and developments in logic. Like 
Peirce, he embraced evolutionary theory, but noted that this was in fact incompatible 
with scientific materialism (SMW 107). Matter, as conceived by scientific materialists, 
cannot evolve, he argued (echoing Peirce). Aligning himself with the work of Lloyd 
Morgan and Samuel Alexander, he worked to provide a new metaphysics which 
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would make the evolution of humanity from nature intelligible (SMW viii). His first 
major work directed towards a broader public, a work in which he also for the first 
time defended and sketched out a new cosmology and new metaphysics, Science and the 
Modern World, was a sustained critique of scientific materialism and its nihilistic 
implications. With a profound appreciation of the implications of the new logic, he 
exposed the failings of logical positivism, anticipating virtually all the arguments 
against it which were developed from the 1950s to the 1970s (PR 8; AI 124ff.; Gare, 
1999). Justifying speculative philosophy, Whitehead not only showed the incoherence 
of the ideas on which social Darwinism was based but provided foundations for 
advancing the ideas of the social liberals. 
For Whitehead, scientific materialism represented the power of abstract thought. It 
was through a process of constructive abstraction that science arrived at simply-located 
bits of matter on the one hand, and minds on the other, enabling the physical world to 
be understood through mathematics. But as Whitehead noted: 
The enormous success of the scientific abstractions, yielding on the one hand matter 
with its simple location in space and time, on the other hand mind, perceiving, suffering, 
reasoning, but not interfering, has foisted onto philosophy the tasks of accepting them 
as the most concrete rendering of fact. Thereby, modern philosophy has been ruined 
(SMW 55). 
It is this which has led to the oscillation between dualists who accept mind and 
matter on equal terms, materialists who attempt to reduce mind to matter, and 
idealists who attempt to explain matter as a mental construct. But such thinking is 
contaminated by taking abstractions for concrete reality, without acknowledging or 
appreciating the level of abstraction involved. This is the “fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness”. As Whitehead again noted, “this juggling with abstractions can never 
overcome the inherent confusion introduced by the ascription of misplaced concreteness to 
the scientific scheme of the seventeenth century” (SMW 55). 
By this Whitehead was not suggesting that we could grasp reality in all its 
complexity if only we are prepared to eschew abstractions. The problem is that 
through the fallacy of misplaced concreteness scientists and philosophers, including 
Idealist philosophers, have remained wedded to a particular set of abstractions, 
blinded to the possibility of developing alternatives. As he argued:  
You cannot think without abstractions; accordingly, it is of the utmost importance 
to be vigilant in critically revising your modes of abstraction. It is here that philosophy 
finds its niche as essential to the healthy progress of society. It is the critic of 
abstractions. A civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is 
doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress (SMW 59).  
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Whitehead examined the Idealists, appreciating their insights into the limitations 
of scientific materialism but criticized them for being too divorced from the scientific 
outlook, failing “to connect, in any organic fashion, the fact of nature with their 
idealistic philosophies” (SMW 64). Nevertheless, Whitehead did not dismiss Idealist 
philosophy. In the “Preface” to PR he wrote of his own work: “if this cosmology be 
deemed successful, it becomes natural at this point to ask whether the type of thought 
involved be not a transformation of some main doctrines of Absolute Idealism onto a 
realistic basis” (PR xiii). Elsewhere, he defined the task of philosophy as the 
transcendence of the opposition between scientific materialism and the German 
tradition of philosophy. As he put it: 
Leibniz introduced the alternative tradition that the entities, which are the 
ultimate actual things, are in some sense procedures of organization. This tradition has 
been the foundation of the great achievements of German philosophy. … It should be 
the task of the philosophical schools of this century to bring together the two streams 
into an expression of the world-picture derived from science, and thereby end the 
divorce of science from the affirmations of our aesthetic and ethical experiences. 
(SMW 156) 
Examining the various forms of confusion engendered by the efforts to escape the 
dualism of mind and matter by privileging one or the other, Whitehead proclaimed 
that “substance is for me the one underlying activity of realization individualizing itself 
in an interlocked plurality of modes. Thus, concrete fact is process” (SMW 70). The 
basic existents are not bits of matter but hierarchically ordered organisms which are 
more than the sum of their parts: “The concrete enduring entities are organisms, so 
that the plan of the whole influences the very characters of the various subordinate 
organisms which enter into it” (SMW 79). That is, he upheld the doctrine of 
emergence of Alexander and Lloyd Morgan. This provided the basis for a revolution 
in science. 
Whitehead’s work is relevant to economics in several ways. To begin with, he 
criticized economic science for having abstracted away from concrete reality and 
having mistaken its abstractions for concrete reality. As he put it:  
It is very arguable that the science of political economy, as studied in its first period 
after the death of Adam Smith (1790), did more harm than good. It … riveted on men 
a certain set of abstractions which were disastrous in their influence on modern 
mentality. It de-humanised industry. [A]ll thought concerned with social organization 
expressed itself in terms of material things and of capital. Ultimate values were 
excluded (SMW 200, 202f.). 
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Beyond this, Whitehead exposed the illusions underlying Herbert Spencer’s social 
Darwinism with its glorification of competition. This theory had “directed almost 
exclusive attention to the aspect of struggle for existence in a fixed environment” 
(SMW 205). Due to this abstraction, Whitehead, pointed out: “The watchwords of the 
nineteenth century have been, struggle for existence, competition, class warfare, 
commercial antagonism between nations, military warfare. The struggle for existence 
has been construed into the gospel of hate” (SMW 205). Freed from the limitations of 
this abstraction, evolutionary theory has different implications: “The full conclusion to 
be drawn from a philosophy of evolution is fortunately of a more balanced character. 
Successful organisms modify their environment. Those organisms are successful which 
modify their environments so as to assist each other” (SMW 205). At the same time, 
Whitehead attacked “the Gospel of Uniformity” (SMW 206) and defended “the power 
of wandering” (SMW 207). “Physical wandering is still important” Whitehead averred, 
“but greater still is the power of man’s spiritual adventures – adventures of thought, 
adventures of passionate feeling, adventures of aesthetic experience” (SMW 207). He 
defended diversity, arguing “Other nations of different habits are not enemies: they 
are godsends” (SMW 207).  
Finally, Whitehead offered a new set of abstraction which, overcoming the 
dualisms generated by the triumph of scientific materialism, allowed humans to be 
understood as creative participants within nature within which values are intrinsic. 
Through this cosmology, Whitehead was able to offer a strong defence of cooperation 
in the pursuit of the common good, the cultivation of individuality and the pursuit of 
the higher ends the social liberals had sought to uphold (SMW 206). In a later work 
Whitehead analysed the loss of freedom associated with the industrial system where: 
“There only remain iron-bound conditions of employment and trivial amusements of 
leisure” (ESP 166). He called for economic statesmanship to recreate the conditions for 
freedom, individuality and variety of opportunity for useful activity “that the great 
commercial corporations are setting themselves to destroy” (ESP 169). Whitehead’s 
new cosmology not only provided a defence of the ideals of social liberalism, it 
provided an alternative characterization of science to logical positivism. In doing so it 
provided the basis not only for criticizing both social Darwinism and neo-classical 
economics, but guidance for overcoming the one-sided abstractions of these traditions 
of thought, for building a new kind of science on more adequate abstractions, a science 
which could analyse the relationship between humans in the context of nature. 
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3. THE HISTORY OF WHITEHEAD’S INFLUENCE ON ECOLOGY AND 
ECONOMICS 
To some extent the potential of this was realized in biology. Whitehead’s ideas were 
taken up by his colleague at Harvard, the ecologist William Morton Wheeler. 
Wheeler, emphasizing symbiotic relations and the emergence of communities as new 
patterns of integration, had a major influence on subsequent ecology in USA, 
particularly through the work of W.C. Allee (Worster, p.320ff.). Whitehead also had a 
profound influence on the theoretical biology movement in Britain. C.H. Waddington, 
a leading member of this movement, questioned the abstractions of mainstream 
biology, including both the “environment” and the “gene”. In taking up Whitehead’s 
questioning of the abstraction of “environment”, Waddington pointed out that 
organisms are not selected by a particular environment, but move in their 
environment, change it, and are selected for according to how they choose to respond 
to it (Waddington, 1969a & 1969b). Adaptation must be thought of in a way that takes 
account of the organism’s organic and conscious reactions to stress situations as well as 
contingencies such as what it has inherited and what environment it happens to be in. 
Examining epigenesis in the development of embryos, that is, the differentiation of 
cells and the generation of form, Waddington showed that there was no simply 
relationship between genes and phenotypes, with epigenesis involving development 
along emergent time paths (chreods) with different degrees of stability. Fitness can only 
be defined properly from the point of view of the population of active, striving 
organisms in various stages of development. So fitness cannot be defined in terms of 
genotypes, and there are even more difficulties involved in the attempt to speak of the 
fitness of single genes. Since any new species produces a more heterogeneous 
environment as a consequence of its interactions with the diverse phenotypes already 
in existence, it will generate the conditions for more species to evolve to fill the new 
ecological niches. And since the newer environments will be a function of an 
increasing number of phenotypes, there will be a tendency for more complex 
phenotypes to evolve which are capable of operating effectively in the more complex 
environments. This work was an important contribution of ecology and anticipated 
later complexity theory. Furthermore, Waddington extended his ideas to encompass 
humanity, and grappled with the major environmental problems facing us 
(Waddington, 1978). 
Independently of both US ecologists and British biologists but influenced by both 
of them, Whitehead had a significant influence on Australian biology through the 
work of W.E. Agar and his student, Charles Birch. Birch became a major 
environmentalist and proponent of Whiteheadian thought, expounding his central 
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ideas on ecology and human ecology in The Liberation of Life, a work he wrote with John 
Cobb Jr. (1981). 
Ecological economics is also realizing the potential of Whitehead’s guidance. 
Ecological economics did not originate with Whiteheadian thought. It originated in 
the work of those who saw the incompatibility of the assumption by economists that 
growth could occur indefinitely and the second law of thermodynamics (Martinez-
Alier, 1990). However, one of the most important proponents of this argument was 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen who did draw on the work of Whitehead (Georgescu-
Roegen, 1971, p.69ff.). Georgescu-Roegen attacked the “arithromorphism” and 
“arithromania” dominating modern thought, and economics in particular – the 
assumption that all concepts can be defined with the precision of numbers and the 
manic quest to understand the world entirely through such arithromorphic concepts 
(p.44f.; p.52). As he noted, “the complex notion of economic development has been 
reduced to a number, the income per capita. The dialectical spectrum of human wants 
(perhaps the most important element of the economic process) has long since been 
covered under the colorless numerical concept of “utility” for which, moreover, 
nobody has yet been able to provide an actual procedure of measurement” (p.52). 
This, he argued, is part of the pervasive tendency of economics to commit the fallacy 
of misplaced concreteness (p.320f.). To counter such tendencies, Georgescu-Roegen 
defended “dialectical” or “vague” concepts which cannot be precisely defined, arguing 
that these are essential for understand qualitative change which is ubiquitous in nature 
and society. Through a wide ranging analysis and critique of science in general and 
thermodynamics and economics in particular, Georgescu-Roegen exposed the flaws in 
neo-classical economics which had blinded it to qualitative change associated with 
historical and evolutionary processes and, most importantly, to the basic conditions of 
existence of the economy and of humanity. He introduced the notion of “entropic 
flow” to characterize the one-way flow beginning with resources and ending with 
waste. 
This diagnosis of the core deficiencies of economic thought was embraced by 
Herman Daly, one of Georgescu-Roegen’s students. Daly went on to become one of 
the founders of The International Society for Ecological Economics and its journal, 
Ecological Economics. Daly’s first major paper in ecological economics proposed that 
economics be conceived as a life science (Daly, 1968). Arguing that ecology had 
abstracted nature from humanity while economics had abstracted humanity from 
nature, in each case failing to acknowledge that such an abstraction had taken place, 
Daly proposed a development of Leontief’s input-output model of the economy for 
Handbook of Whiteheadian Process Thought Volume 1, Ed. Michel Weber and Will Desmond, 
(Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2008). Pp.161-176. 
 
16 
ARRAN GARE: ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND HUMAN ECOLOGY 
overcoming these abstractions and uniting the two sciences. In later work, Daly 
identified a range of abstractions used by economists and then taken to be concrete 
reality. The clearest case is the neo-classical model of the economy as a circular flow 
between business and the public of money in one direction, and factors of production 
and goods in the other. This, Daly pointed out, is like abstracting the circulatory 
system of an organism from its metabolism in which it ingests food, transforms it and 
excretes waste, and then treating the circulatory system as the total organism (Daly, 
1996, p.193). Acknowledging “entropic flow” and acknowledging a range of 
distinctions ignored by neoclassical economists, Daly argued that we must aim at a 
steady-state economy, one which does not increase this entropic flow but concentrates 
on greater efficiency in the use of materials to produce a better quality of life (Daly, 
1977). Achieving such ends, Daly argued, involves bringing ethics (and implicitly, 
politics), back into the picture. We need to change values. We need to think about 
what the good life is and how to ensure that the market is controlled to maintain a 
steady-state and use resources efficiently to enable people to live a good life. Daly 
devoted considerable attention to what kinds of institutions would be necessary for 
these ends, arguing for institutions to prevent the concentration of income and the 
accumulation of excessive wealth, to limit births and to place quotas on resource 
depletion (1977, Chap.3). In the end, Daly called for biophysical equilibrium and moral 
growth (1977, Chap.8). Effectively, Daly (who often cites Hobson) has been reviving the 
social liberalism with which Whitehead was aligned. 
Daly teamed up with John Cobb Jr. to write For the Common Good: redirecting the 
economy toward community, the environment, and a sustainable future (1989, 1994). To fully 
appreciate the significance of this title it is necessary to appreciate both the role 
ascribed to the common good by the social liberals and the vehemence with which this 
notion was attacked by the rational choice theorists associated with neo-classical 
economists and neo-liberalism. For the Common Good began with a thorough analysis of 
the abstractions ascribed misplaced concreteness by economists: the market, 
measurements of economic success, homo economicus and land. It called for a 
fundamental transformation of universities from academic disciplines to “thought in 
service of community”. It called from a reorientation in thought from chrematistics 
(the study of money) to oikonomia, the study of the household, from individualism to 
person-in-community, from cosmopolitanism to communities of communities, from 
matter and rent to energy and biosphere. It offered policies for community in the 
United States, attacking the doctrine of free trade and promoting decentralization of 
political and economic power as real alternatives to the policies of the neo-liberals and 
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neo-conservatives. It also called for a new role for the USA, from world domination to 
national security. Finally, the work offered an Index of Sustainable Welfare as an 
alternative to Gross National Product as a measure of the true health of the economy 
(further developed by Clifford Cobb and John Cobb Jr., 1994). This gave a quite 
different picture of the US economy than measures of GNP, particularly after 1980. 
“Economic welfare has been deteriorating for a decade,” they noted, “largely as a 
result of growing income inequality, the exhaustion of resources, and unsustainable 
reliance on capital from overseas to pay for domestic consumption and investment” 
(p.507). All this was presented from the coherent perspective of Whiteheadian process 
philosophy. Apart from editing several anthologies on economics, ecology and ethics 
(1973, 1980, 1993) and a major statement and defence of his doctrines (1996) Daly has 
now produced a major textbook on ecological economics: Ecological Economics: Principles 
and Applications (2004), elaborating and further defending the arguments of For the 
Common Good.  
Daly has also gone well outside the discipline of economics to produce with 
Thomas Prugh and Robert Costanza a major defence of strong democracy: The Local 
Politics of Global Sustainability (2000). Given Daly’s efforts to construe the market as a 
part of the community which can at times be destructive and his concern to re-embed 
the market in the community, it was logical that he should have begun work on 
political institutions. And given his concern to revive communities, it was logical for 
him to embrace democracy as the form of power that involves people and thereby 
strengthens community. In developing these arguments, Daly and his colleague made 
an extremely important point. They noted that in USA environmentalism is a mile 
wide, but only an inch deep (p.90). In this work they provided an explanation for this. 
In practice people evaluate courses of action according to the role they are playing. If 
the role they are playing is that of consumers, they will tend to want the best they can 
get for their money. Any amount of moral growth will only have a minor impact on 
the decisions they make. But if the role they are evaluating courses of action from is 
that of governors, then they are likely to take a very different perspective. As the 
authors put it: 
The citizen preference orientation is currently attenuated to the point of 
invisibility. Yet strengthening it would ineluctably bring people face-to-face with the 
problems of governance, including those of sustainability. Citizens brought into 
confrontation with the stark problems of governing their communities through hands-
on participation … would be educated in the sources of community troubles, in the 
origins of their way of life, and in the trade-offs that must be accepted in any collective 
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choice. With regard to sustainability issues in particular, self-governing citizens would 
more likely learn the ecological costs of their community’s lifestyle and socioeconomic 
character (p.99). 
This brings us back to the central insights of the social liberals which Whitehead’s 
philosophy advanced but which were somehow lost sight of as the twentieth century 
progressed, the importance of democracy as both means and an end for the 
development of the full potentialities of people, as participants in institutions, to 
contribute to the common good, with the common good now extended to encompass 
the whole of nature. 
4. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS AND HUMAN ECOLOGY 
However, Daly’s excursion into political philosophy highlights something 
fundamentally problematic about ecological economics as a discipline, a dimension of 
which both Daly and Cobb appear to be acutely aware. The evolution of universities 
has produced a tendency towards specialization that has fragmented knowledge. This 
has been conducive to the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. As noted, Daly and Cobb 
raised this issue in For the Common Good, suggesting reforms in universities to overcome 
this tendency by giving a place to cosmology, to interdisciplinary studies and efforts to 
grapple with global problems (p.364f.). It is difficult to overestimate how deep rooted 
this tendency to fragmentation of knowledge is, however, and some attention needs to 
be paid to the forces driving it. One of these is the quest to establish areas of expertise 
through which knowledge can be commodified and lucrative careers based (Levins 
and Lewontin, 1985, Chap. 8). This force has had a pervasive influence on the kinds of 
knowledge produced by these disciplines – they are heavily biased towards knowledge 
of how to control. Ecology, along with biology generally, has been affected by this. 
Donald Worster in his study of the history of ecology has traced this effect, noting how 
this has produced “bioeconomics” by which nature is construed as an economic 
system. As Hermann Reinheimer wrote: 
Every day, from sunrise until sunset, myriads of [plant] laboratories, factories, 
workshops and industries all the world over, on land and in the sea, in the earth and 
on the surface soil, are incessantly occupied, adding each its little contribution to the 
general fund of organic wealth… (Worster, p.291). 
Worster noted Whitehead’s efforts to overcome “one-eyed reason, deficient in its 
vision of depth” (p.316 from SMW 74) and the influence his notion of relational 
processes had on ecology. However, this influence was eclipsed. It was the 
bioeconomic vision which came to dominate. As Worster noted, 
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By the 1960s, orthodox scientific thought was virtually monopolized by 
thermodynamics and bioeconomics. The organicists’ vision of relatedness was 
confined to the eco-system model of the New Ecologists, who were quite as reductive 
in their way as Whitehead’s bětes noires, the eighteenth century philosophes. From most 
professional circles, at least, the metabiological, idealizing tendencies of organicism 
had been firmly exorcised: Ecology at last had got its head out of the clouds, its feet on 
solid ground, and its hands on something to measure. … It was thought that, to qualify 
as a field of objective knowledge, ecology could have no further dealings with the 
private, muddled realms of value, philosophy, and ethics (p.332). 
Bioeconomics is the kind of knowledge which would enable ecologists to lay claim 
to an expertise in environmental management.  
Daly did not formulate ecological economics in terms of the Whiteheadean strand 
of ecology as promoted by Wheeler, Waddington and Birch but in terms of 
bioeconomics. The influence of bioeconomics is manifest in the relative inattention by 
Daly to the exploration by organisms and to the possible contributions of their efforts 
to survive to the environments of other organisms, features of life to which Whitehead 
had drawn attention and which were amplified by Waddington. Without this, the 
challenge to social Darwinism presented by Whitehead and Waddington is weakened. 
Ecological economics as a science presents itself as a tool of management for 
governments. So even Daly’s ecological economics is to some extent tainted by one-
eyed reason, and perhaps partly for this reason has not fully realized its potential to 
subvert the prevailing neo-liberal culture.  
What is needed to free science completely from one-eyed reason? Whitehead 
provided the basis for an answer to this when he characterized the task of a university 
as “the creation of the future, so far as rational thought, and civilized modes of 
appreciation, can affect the issue” (MT 171). A science which no longer implicitly 
positions itself in relation to subjects considered outside the world and acting on it will 
have to reflexively acknowledge its development and its claims against rival 
orientations to living to be actively participating within the world being understood 
(Taylor, 2005, Prologue). This will be a science which explicitly relates itself to 
philosophy. While Daly has done this, it is also necessary in order to achieve such a 
link between the multiplicity of science disciplines and reflexive philosophy not just to 
encourage interdisciplinary work, as Daly and Cobb called for, but to develop a range 
of trans-disciplines that facilitate comprehension of the relationship of more specific 
trans-disciplines, disciplines and sub-disciplines to each other. To some extent the 
humanities, both philosophy and history, can and should play this role, but more is 
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needed. Ecological economics itself has been presented with some justification as a 
trans-discipline. But to relate the evolution of modern civilization to the broader 
evolutionary history of nature and humanity, to relate the study of markets not only to 
ecological processes and institutions associated with economic activity but to other 
social forms and institutions of diverse societies and civilizations, to identify the 
ecologically sustainable and ecologically unsustainable social forms, to comprehend 
and align people in relation to the power struggles within and between societies and to 
efforts by people to understand and control their destinies, and to reflexively 
acknowledge the participation of science in such efforts, to evaluate all these and orient 
people for action, requires more than philosophy, history and ecological economics; it 
requires human ecology. 
While in the past human ecology has floundered in the face of the complexity of 
the theoretical problems confronting it, having to deal both with ecological complexity 
and the complexity of social dynamics simultaneously (Kormondy & Brown, 1998), 
recent work in theoretical ecology has provided the means to incorporate the 
“population-community approach” with its focus on the interaction between 
organisms and the formation of communities, with the “bioeconomic” “process-
functionalist approach” with its focus on energy flows and nutrient cycles (Allen, 
T.F.H and Starr, Thomas B., 1982; O’Neill et.al., 1986; Allen and Hoekstra, 1992), 
and to extend this to encompass humanity and its history (Dyke, 1988; Gare, 2000b & 
2002; Allen et.al., 2003). This theoretical perspective is based on a form of hierarchy 
theory which does not derive from Whitehead; but it is a form of process thinking 
consistent with his process metaphysics (Gare, 2000c). One of its implications is that 
the very being of any entity as self-creating is taken to involve self-constraining. This 
means that when it comes to humans, the constraints associated with ethics and 
politics are no longer seen as extrinsic to people but as an aspect of their self-creation.  
While human ecology formulated in this way is consistent with the ecological 
economics of Daly and Cobb, the commitment to democracy and the conditions for 
achieving it can be made even stronger (Gare, 2004). It provides a broader framework 
for examining what is required to achieve democracy throughout the world and 
presents the struggle to address global environmental problems in a more positive way. 
Daly defines the basic ethical principle of his ecological economics as: “We should 
strive for sufficient per capita wealth – efficiently maintained and allocated, and 
equitably distributed – for the maximum number of people that can be sustained over 
time under these conditions” (Daly, 1996, p.220). This is a moralistic injunction which 
tends to assume a disjunction between how people should behave and their self-
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interested inclinations. The social liberals, and Whitehead following them, tended to 
think more in terms of characterizing the good life and working out the conditions for 
achieving it. They upheld a vision of life in which the pursuit of highest ends requires 
the recognition and appreciation of others, holding that a life of self-indulgence is not 
only destructive of others but intrinsically deficient. The quest to be able to live a life 
not destructive of nature, other people and the future is not a curtailment of one’s 
freedom but is central to the pursuit of liberty, the condition under which people, both 
individuals and communities, can develop their full, unique potentials to freely 
contribute to the common good. Developing such a trans-discipline and such an 
outlook and using this to revive the tradition of social liberalism is only in its early 
stages and manifests the continued importance of Whitehead as a guide for the 
elaboration of new abstractions. Human ecology will be subject to the usual pressures 
of universities to develop as another specialist discipline to provide particular area of 
expertise for environmental management rather than the perspective needed by 
citizens to create and sustain a genuinely democratic society. The prospects for success 
in this regard are intimately related to the prospects of process thought generally, and 
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